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Social support networks play a key role in human livelihood security, especially in vulnerable 
communities. Here we explore how evolutionary ideas of kin selection and intra-household resource 
competition can explain individual variation in daily-support network size and composition in a South-
Central Ethiopian agricultural community. We consider both domestic and agricultural help across two 
generations with different large-wealth transfer norms that yield different contexts for sibling competition.  
For farmers who inherited land rights from family, first-borns were more likely to report daily support from 
parents and to have larger non-parental kin networks (n=180). Compared with other farmers, first-borns 
were also more likely to reciprocate their parents’ support, and to help non-parental kin without reciprocity. 
For farmers who received land rights from the government (n=151), middle-born farmers reported more 
non-parental kin in their support networks compared with other farmers; non-reciprocal interactions were 
particularly common in both directions. This suggests a diversification of adult support networks to non-
parental kin, possibly in response to a long-term parental investment disadvantage of being middle-born 
sons. In all instances regardless of inheritance, last-born farmers were the most disadvantaged in terms of 
kin support. 
Overall, we found that non-reciprocal interactions among farmers followed kin selection predictions. Direct 
reciprocity explained a substantial part of the support received from kin, suggesting the importance of the 







































































Social capital, alongside natural capital, physical or produced capital, and human capital, is an important 
part of sustainable development. Because social capital can be defined as “the features of social 
organization, such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit” (Putnam 2000), social capital, by virtue of its collective nature, has an important influence 
on resource sustainability at a population/community level (Pretty 2003). In developing countries that lack 
resource access, infrastructure, or social policies to support vulnerable communities, networks have been 
shown to not only provide the social insurance and safety nets that foster resilience and recovery in times of 
hardship (Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Caudell, Rotolo and Grima 2015), but also to build human capital, 
material capital, and improve community well-being (Narayan and Pritchett 1999, Aldrich 2012, Aldrich 
and Meyer 2014). 
Using an evolutionary perspective, this research aims to investigate daily support networks as strategies 
used by individuals and families in rural South-Central rural Ethiopia and to identify the most vulnerable 
among them. This agricultural population is largely dependant of land for cereals and vegetables 
production. Personal support networks are comprised of kin and non-kin supporters, which is an important 
distinction from an evolutionary perspective: kin-selection theory predicts that kin will allocate resources to 
their relatives in a manner that enhances transmission of their common genes (Hamilton 1964). In other 
words, kin support is an investment in one’s own fitness, either directly (via direct descendants) or 
indirectly (in other kin), where fitness is defined as the survival of the biological lineage across generations, 
or the number and quality of descendants achieved by accumulation of social, material, and biological 
capital. According to kin selection, individuals face trade-offs in their effort to acquire finite resources; 
thus, they make decisions (consciously or not) about resource allocation in their support networks 
according to genetic relatedness (Hamilton 1964). Recipient characteristics other than genetic relatedness 
also influence resource allocation decisions, such as reproductive potential and survival rate, which are 
shaped by gender (Trivers 1972, Trivers and Willard 1973) and birth order (Clutton-Brock 1984; Hrdy and 




































































might possibly influence kin investment decision. In rural Ethiopia, land access influences livelihood 
security and reproduction and is, thus, probably important to kin investment patterns. 
Parental investment, which is the most fundamental kin investment, significantly influences the fitness of 
parents and children (Trivers 1974); it includes various investments, from parental care and education 
(Gibson and Sear 2010, Gibson and Lawson 2011), to wealth transfers during life and at death (Judge and 
Hrdy 1992, Hrdy and Judge 1993, Gibson and Gurmu 2011). Among the various land owner societies 
facing limited resources around the world, a gradient of wealth transfer systems has evolved from biased 
multigeniture (Clarke and Low 1992, Towner 2001, Faurie, Russel and Lumma, 2009, Gibson and Gurmu 
2011) to unigeniture (Boone 1986, Hrdy and Judge 1993, Voland and Dunbar 1995, Strassman and Clarke 
1998), favouring some children over others, possibly to ensure lineage survival across generations and/or to 
avoid capital fragmentation and economic decline within very few generations. As a consequence, favoured 
children enjoy a better resource status and, possibly, might enjoy larger kin support because they represent 
safer investment for the future of the lineage compared with their sibling. 
Research on parental investment, has yielded variable and occasionnally conflicting results about birth 
order (Draper and Hames 2000, Faurie, Russel and Lumma, 2009, Stanton et al. 2014). In Ethiopia, a first-
born son advantage for agricultural productivity, marriage, and reproductive success has been shown in 
the context of family land transfers but was not observed when no family land transfers occured (Gibson 
and Gurmu 2011), suggesting that inequalities in intra-household material resource access for brothers 
only arise in the context of competition for limited resources.  
The importance of kin selection and reciprocity for cooperation with kin is discussed in the literature 
(Clutton-Brock 2009, Jaeggi and Gurven 2013, Taborsky 2013, Carter and Wilkinson 2013). Some 
individuals might actively engage in network manipulation by seeking extra interactants to secure 
additional support; one way to lower the cost for potential interactants is through reciprocity, which lowers 
the costs for interactants (Trivers 1971). 
Herein, we investigate whether patterns in the kin and non-kin make-up of adult children’s support 




































































agriculturalists with different large-wealth transfer patterns.  
The Ethiopian context offers a unique setting to look directly at the effects of intra-household competition 
and kin investment. Ethiopia’s recent political past, including the Marxist revolution that led to land 
confiscation and subsequent redistributions in 1975, 1988, and 1990 in this agricultural area, provides a 
natural experiment to study two cohorts of farmers that received land either from family transfer (inheritor 
group) or from government (redistribution group). In the study community, family land transfers primarily 
concern male farmers. Even the successive government redistributions targeted male heads of household. 
Nowadays, by law, all children, females and males, have the right to claim their share of inheritance. In 
practice, most families provide land to their sons and provide other type of goods to their daughters, who 
marry out their communities. Because of rapid population growth and limited land availability, farmland is 
becoming a scarce resource in this part of Ethiopia, so we expect this to increase the investment biases 
predicted by kin selection, but in different ways for the two farmer groups.  
Farmers in the younger group became adults after the government redistribution programs ended; thus, 
their land access was completely determined by their parents, they received farmland before or for their 
marriage and received or might receive additional land upon their parents’ deaths. Previous research 
suggests a multigeniture with a first-born son advantage for the youngest generation (Gibson and Gurmu 
2011).  
The oldest group’s parents were not permitted to favour any of their sons for large wealth transfers because, 
in theory, all sons received land of equal size and quality from the government; furthermore, this sweeping 
policy likely affected other types of parental and kin investment besides wealth transfers. Studies on 
parental investment in the context of equal resource access suggest that first and last-born children tend to 
be advantaged over middle-born children (Hertwig, Davis and Sulloway 2002), who receive fewer 
cumulative investment due to competition with younger and older siblings. Faurie, Russel and Lumma 
(2009) corroborated Hertwig, Davis and Sulloway’s (2002) finding among sons of rural pre-industrial 
Finns: middle-born sons appeared to produce significantly less offspring than first- or lastborn sons. 
Concerning relational capital biases, cues from studies of Western societies suggested that disadvantaged 




































































diversification of support including other kin (Salmon and Daly 1998, Rhode et al. 2003,) or non-kin 
(Salmon and Daly 1998, Salmon 2003).  
Thus, to understand the complexity of support patterns, it is important to discriminate among sources of 
support (e.g., parents, non-parental kin, and non-kin), to identify the directions of support interactions (non-
reciprocal or reciprocal), and to discriminate between birth order and intra-sex birth order. Finally, the daily 
agricultural and domestic support networks of household heads should be an accurate proxy for measuring 
social capital in a mixed economy where cash is not widespread, because such support entails meaningful 
energetic and material costs and has direct impacts on household wellbeing. Because this study population 
is patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal, with strong gender differences in socio-economic activities that 
could affect individuals’ social networks, we focused on the support networks of male heads of household.  
This paper aims to test two sets of evolutionary predictions about daily support network size and 
composition among Ethiopian farmers: 1) Daily support networks will vary according to sibling 
competition, with different birth-order biases for the generation groups. 2) Farmers’ daily support networks 
will pattern in a way that is consistent with reciprocity and kin-selection theory.  
Prediction 1: We will observe birth-order biases in support network size and composition 
At the outset, we expect to observe two scenarios regarding daily subsistence and domestic support: 
1. In the context of limited resources, first-born sons might interact more with parents and with non-
parental kin compared with other birth-order categories, because, first-born sons represent a less 
risky investment for lineage survival (Hrdy and Judge 1993, Gibson and Gurmu 2011). Later-born 
sons being disadvantaged in kin interactants, might diversify their networks to include non-kin, 
possibly through reciprocity  
2. For farmers who received their land from the government without discrimination, first and last-
born sons might have enjoyed extra-parental investment in terms of cumulative investment in their 
lifetimes (Kidwell 1982, Sulloway 1996, Hertwig, Davis and Sulloway 2002, Faurie, Russel and 
Lumma 2009). If those differences held into adulthood, middle-born sons might still represent 
worthwhile investment for non-parental kin, especially if they are more active in diversifying their 




































































reciprocity (Trivers 1971, Salmon 2003). This strategy would result in middle-born sons having 
larger non-parental kin and non-kin networks compared with first and last-born sons. 
Prediction 2: Variation in farmers’ support networks is consistent with reciprocity and kin-selection 
theories 
Reciprocity is a strategy by which people obtain greater resource security and social support by 
diversifying their networks and engaging in interactions with more people. However, because of time and 
cognitive constraints (Dunbar 2008) that limit the number of social contacts a person can meaningfully 
manage, the benefits of a reciprocal support strategy are limited. We expect that most non-kin interactions 
would be based on reciprocity, while non-direct reciprocity (unidirectional interactions) would be more 
common with kin and even more common with close-kin, according to expected benefits of inclusive 
fitness (Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1972). Kin might constitute an important proportion of men’s reciprocated 







































































Participants and study sites 
Data were collected from two representative neighbouring villages with high out-migration, during 2009 
and 2010. The communities were selected from a pool of villages previously studied by Gibson (2002) in 
the Oromia region, Ethiopia, in the green midlands (altitude of 2200 to 2700m) between the town of Iteya 
and the city of Assala, where the socio-economics and demographic context is well known. The study 
communities had no electricity access, no direct road access and no working tap-water access at the time of 
the data collection. Community members relied mostly on a mixed economy, where cash was sporadically 
available. The altitude and the relatively temperate climate permits growth of a variety of cereals (wheat, 
teff, barley, sorghum, maize), vegetables (cabbages, carrots, potatoes, lentils, onions etc) and smaller 
quantities of other crop types (tobacco, oil seeds, eucalyptus) on their small farmland plot (landsize of 5ha 
maximum). Farmers cultivate their land with animal-drawn plows. Remittances from out-migration were 
rare (Gibson and Gurmu 2012) despite a relative proximity to urban centres (~10−15km). The ethnic 
composition of the study population includes Shoa Oromo, Arsi Oromo, and Amara. Shoa and Amara 
families have been intermarrying for several generations and are Christians, while Arsi Oromo are Muslims 
and do not usually intermarry with non-Muslims. Our sample included mostly Oromo farmers and a small 
number of Amara farmers (20.5% of the redistribution group and 20.6% of the inheritor group) that did not 
allow for more detailed analyses. Traditionally, Oromo and Amara have different inheritance systems. 
Contrary to most of Oromo women, Amara women had access to family land. However, governmental 
redistribution focused on the head of household, resulting in women being excluded from redistribution and 
land access. Amara women from the youngest generation are more likely to receive land from their family 
compared with Oromo women. However, a study on land access for an Amara population has shown a 
first-born son advantage for inheritance (Congdon Fors, Houngbedji, Lindskog 2017), suggesting similar 
patterns of parental bias for Oromo and Amara for the young generation. All families arrived between the 
19th century and the last Italian war (1935), and have known a system of small landlords, tenants, small 
landholders and landless workers. The Marxist Derg regime came to power in 1974 and started an agrarian 
reform in 1975. In 1975, land lordism, tenancies, inheritances were abolished, and all lands came under 




































































controlled land access. PAs confiscated and redistributed periodically lands, in 1975, 1988, and 1990 to 
households based on family size, land availability and land quality (Tefera et al. 2002). Today, a vast 
majority of farmers in the study sites are still members of the PAs, and take part in meetings about local 
development and agriculture. Informal contractual tenure arrangements were not resported as widespread in 
those villages by the farmers, but might be underestimated due to their unofficial status (−up to 24% of all 
farmlands in the same area might be under contract, Gavian and Ehui 1999). It is also not known to what 
extent contracts are made within the family, and are, thus, not reported. Focus group discussions have 
revealed numerous family strategies for land sharing among sons, including brothers sharecropping a piece 
of land provided by their father, fathers passing on officially the land rights to their sons or on contrary 
fathers officially maintaining their land rights while their sons farm the land, suggesting other ways to land 
access than official wealth transfer from family or government. Within families, siblings reported different 
roles according to birth-order rank. Elder sons were expected to take care of younger siblings, and, when 
possible, to offer some large gift (i.e.: a cow) for younger brothers’ wedding. Younger brothers, on the 
other hands, were expected to be obey older siblings and to serve them back through labour. Finally, some 
informants specified that last-borns were expected to remain with their parents and care for them as they 
age; this, in turn, might increase their access to their parents’ land. The education level is relatively low, 
with few individuals finishing high-school education outside the village (11.9% and 19.4% of the 
redistribution and inheritor groups, respectively). Finally, some impoverished villagers labored as daily 
workers for other farmers. Non-agricultural jobs in the villages were rare and consisted mostly of 
governmental jobs or religious jobs. Non-agricultural cash-generating activities (local business, crafts) 
mostly served as side income to farming and were not widespread.  
Recruitment 
All households in the villages were visited and heads of households (hh) were interviewed (N=590). 
Multiple visits were sometimes necessary and only a few households (<10) were not recruited due to the 
long-term absence of their head of household. Because the study communities are patriarchal, patrilineal 
and patrilocal and present strong gender roles and enforce strong gender roles for socio-economics 




































































network. Support networks considered here include daily supports for farming and domestic activities in a 
broad, such a help with farm activities (ploughing, seeding, weeding, cattle care, and gifting or loan of 
seeds, crops, and other materials including animals), help with domestic activities (gifting or loan of food, 
clothes, money, water, firewood, or other materials), help during sickness (transport or care), help with 
house construction, and ceremonial duties. Because first-born and last-born sons might enjoy some extra-
parental investment (Kidwell 1982, Hertwig, Davis and Sulloway 2002, Faurie, Russel and Lumma 2009), 
and because birth rank does not discriminate for the last-born category, we used three intra-sex birth-order 
categories (firstborn, middle born and lastborn sons) instead of birth rank. Thus, only heads of household 
with at least two brothers born from the same father, who survived until fifteen years old, were included in 
the models (N=331). Only farmers owning land rights were included, to focus on the impact of wealth 
transfers. Landless male farmers generally worked for other farmers, joined another household or, 
increasingly, moved to the city; these men likely had very different social characteristics compared with 
landowners. 
Procedures 
The Ethics Committee of the University of Bristol approved all study materials and methods. Research 
permits were obtained from national, regional, zonal, and local Ethiopian authorities. All participants were 
informed about the nature of the study, data confidentiality, and of their rights to withdraw at anytime. 
Participants were required to either sign or fingerprint an informed consent document before participating. 
A pilot study was organised in a similar neighbouring community, to confirm that the questions were 
appropriate for the local context (e.g., non-sensitive and understood by the local community) and to 
identify any erros in translation or terminology. Our mixed-methods data collection approach included 
questionnaires, focus group discussions and semi-directed qualitative interviews. Interviews and semi-
structured questionnaires following standard anthropological data collection (Fowler 1995; Krosnick and 
Fabrigar 1997; Bernard 2002) were undertaken. A team of seven fluent Amharic-Oromic speakers collected 
questionnaires from the heads of households. Questionnaires were translated from English to Oromic and 






































































The Marxist revolution, which resulted in a massive land confiscation and land redistributions, in 1975, 
1988 and 1990, allows for a natural experiment to study two farmer groups who received land from 
different sources, one from the government through the PAs and the other from their family. Because 
farmers did not all marry and start a family at the same age, some men from the older generations were 
excluded from governmental redistribution and some from the younger generation who married very early 
might have benefited from it. Individuals who were not part of the PA for any reason might have been 
excluded from governmental land access. Patterns of land transfer can be complex, however, the vast 
majority of men received land rights through similar pathways as their generational peers. Participants in 
the older group (>40 years old) mostly received their land rights from government land redistribution 
(redistribution farmers). 93.4% received land rights from the government. Some received it from their 
family (6%), and only one bought it with credit. Some men had parents who received land from 
governmental redistribution; thus, they might receive inheritance upon their parents’ death, thus 
accumulating land from the government and from their family, but only a small proportion already received 
both government and family land (9.3%). However, most men in the older generation received land parcels 
equal in land and quality from the government. Respondents of the younger group (<41 years old) mostly 
obtained their land after the last governmental land redistribution, and where thus, dependent upon their 
parents (=inheritor farmers) for land access. 89.4% received land from their families. 10% received land 
from the government only. Only one farmer bought it. A small proportion received land from both their 
family and the government (10%).  
Data 
Socio-economic, demographic and support network data about households and household heads were 
collected with questionnaires during interviews. Support network data were generated from both questions: 
1) Whom do you help on a daily basis for agricultural and domestic support? 2) Who are your daily helpers 
for agricultural and domestic support? For both questions, respondents gave the person’s full name, 
relationship, place of residence, and type of support provided. When the same person was cited for both 




































































we labeled the contact a non-direct reciprocator. Herein, we define reciprocity as here current direct 
reciprocity at the time of data collection; and we define non-direct reciprocity as all other bi-directional 
interactions (e.g., contingent reciprocity on longer timescale) or unidirectional (altruism or indirect 
reciprocity, which are difficult to discriminate from each others).  We preferred the terminology “non-
direct reciprocity” over “altruism”, because it includes indirect reciprocity (through one, several or many 
peers), and also delayed reciprocity. Degrees of reciprocity were too complex to be measured, for example, 
help received and given might or might not be of equal value, intrinsically or relatively to the mutual 
interactants (considering each person’s age, wealth or social status, physical condition, energy needs and 
expenditure etc.), nor of perceived equal value. We extracted the network configuration (presence or 
absence of support -received and/or given) and support network size (number of supporters or number of 
persons helped) from each participant’s responses.  
Respondent age, farmland size (ha), village (1 or 2), parents being alive or deceased and number of 
brothers or sibling who survived to 15 years old were included in the models when possible. 
Because there are redundancies across religious affiliation and ethnicity (Amara and Shoa Oromo are 
Christians, while Arsi Oromo are Muslims), religion (Christians/Muslims) was preferred as a main-effect 
variable over ethnicity (Shoa/Arsi/Amara) because it better represents the between-group differences in 
among the participants. We also included education level (finished high school education/not) in our 
models. 
Farmers from village 1 have significantly smaller plots of land (1.24±1.06) compared to village 2 
(1.70±1.20; Mann Withney U Test: U=9848.00, z=-4.091, p=0.0001), they also reported 
(mean±sd=3.10±1.47) significantly smaller network sizes than village 2 farmers (3.69±1.18, Mann 
Whitney U test, U=10322.00, z=-3.614, p=0.000), which is why we discriminated between villages 1 and 2 
in the models. 
Some studies have suggested that of network size and structure remain relatively consistent across the 
lifespan, despite individual variations (e.g. Dunbar 2008). Those variations might affect network 
composition and network size, which is why we also explored age (Hill and Dunbar 2003) and wealth 
effects. For example, young parents might receive more support from kin for domestic work and might 




































































more support due to their youth and physical strenght, while people might begin to receive support as they 
age. 
Connections between material capital and social capital have been shown many times (Lewis 2010). We 
choose farmland size as a proximate for material capital, because it is a key resource in our study for 
survival and reproductive outcomes (Gibson and Gurmu 2011) was chosen. Previous pilot studies showed 
that wealth oriented questions were sensitive. Indeed, we found that farmers were uncomfortable answering 
questions about wealth, but accepted questions about the size of their land, which is public knowledge 
anyway. Questions about livestock appeared to be fairly sensitive.  
Thus we narrowed our questions about wealth to farmland size. Because most of the farming is agricultural 
a focus on farmland size was adequate, especially considering that  both villages had similar ecologies and 
agro-systems. Furthermore, because farmers use oxen for animal traction to work the land, the number of 
oxen owned is usually proportionated to the farmland size. 
Variation in farmland size is reduced (range: 0.25-5ha only), probably because the last Marxist 
redistribution was fairly recent (1992), and it may be that not enough time has passed for inequalities to 
grow. However, because social capital includes a collective dimension through interactions between 
community members, it was relevant to consider respondent relative wealth in their village. We tested for 
an interaction effect between land size and village, but we did not include them in final models when they 
yielded non-significant results. 
Database and data analyses 
Socio-economic, demographic, and social-network data were input in into a Microsoft Access (Redmond, 
WA, USA) database. IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, version 22.0. software was used for all analyses. 
(IBM, Armonk, NY, USA). We created one large data frame that included socio-economic, demographic, 
and network size and composition data for each respondent. Descriptive statistics are presented in the 
appendix.  
Generalized linear models with Poisson regressions were fit to compare birth-order categories effects on 
full network size, kin network size, non-parental kin network size, number of non-parental kin reciprocators 




































































education, sibling size or male sibling size, land origin, and generational group. Estimated marginal means 
are presented in the figures.  
We fit logistic regressions with independent variables to identify effects of birth-order categories associated 
with parental interactions among farmers’ support networks. We only performed analyses of parent 
interactions for the inheritor group, because a large proportion of the redistribution group (respondent>40 
years old) have elderly or deceased parents or deceased parents (87% of the inheritor group had at least one 
parent being alive, for 36% of the redistribution group). Logistic regressions were performed for three types 
of interactions: 1) parents cited as interactants (helpers or receivers) 2) parents are named as helpers 3) 
parents are named as reciprocators. Independent variables we included in the models were: age, education, 
religion, land size and respondent village, intra-sex birth-order categories, and survival of at least one 
parent/none.  
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were performed for respondents of both groups to compare the number of kin 
to the number of non-kin, the number of close kin (parents, children and sibling) to the number of distant 









































































We estimated that mean (± sd) network sizes for domestic and agricultural interactions were 3.48±1.24 for 
the inheritor group and 3.18±1.51 for the redistribution group. Two major trends emerged from our 
analyses: 1) Support networks varied according to competition among brothers and 2) reciprocity and kin-
selection shaped farmers’ daily support networks. 
Prediction 1: Support networks varied according to birth-order biases 
We fit GLMs with Poisson regression to explore the impact of intra-sex birth order on network size and kin 
network size, while controlling for age, number of male siblings, land size, and village (Table 1). In model 
1, only village had an effect on total network size (kin and non-kin), where village 1 respondents reported 
smaller networks than village 2 respondents (village 1/2 ratio: expB (95% CI)=0.8 (0.7–1.0), P=0.010). 
When focusing on the number of kin cited (model 2), an intra-sex birth-order effect was present among 
first-born sons (expB (95% CI)=1.5 (1.1–2.0), P=0.005) and middle-born sons (expB (95% CI)=1.5 (1.2–
2.0), P=0.002) who both reporting more kin than last-born sons. Because the law states that both males and 
females can inherit, a similar model that includes birth order for all children instead of just brothers was 
tested (Model 4, Table 1), but no significant birth-order effect was observed, suggesting that indeed intra-
sex birth order is a better measure of competition than overall sibling birth order. 
Age did not have a significant effect on network size in the above models. However, when we 
discriminated between the inheritor and redistribution generations and when we controlled for an 
interaction effect between generation and birth order, significant differences in kin network sizes were 
observable according to birth-order categories (Table 1, Model 3, Figure 1), with first-born sons of the 
inheritor group and middle-born sons of the redistribution group having the most kin in their networks. 
 
Fig. 1 Number of kin, listed in support networks, presented as marginal means +SE (N=331) for each intra-
sex birth-order categories (first, middle and last-born sons) and generations (inheritor and redistribution 
groups). Covariates appearing in the model are fixed at the following values: male sibling size=5, land 






































































Across generation, kin accounted for over half of the people in respondents’ networks (57.1% and 51.2% 
for the inheritor and redistribution groups, respectively, Table 2). Interactions with parents accounted for 
17.1% and 6.0% of respondents’ total interactions for the inheritor and redistribution groups, respectively. 
Interactions with non-parental kin (40.0% and 45.2% overall for the inheritor and redistribution groups, 
respectively) were distributed as follows:  22.5% and 17.7% were with brothers, 0.6% and 15.8% were with 
children, and 4.5% and 2.3% were with sisters. The small proportion of daily interactions with sisters is due 
to the local custom of women marrying outside their community. 
To understand how direct reciprocity and non-direct reciprocity contribute to individual support networks, 
different types of interactions were explored for each of the main interactant categories, which included 
parents and non-parental kin. 
1.1 Interactions with parents 
Among the inheritor farmers (n=180), 55% named at least one parent as an interactant, and half of those 
reported a reciprocating relationship (n=49). Reciprocal relationships with parents were reported by 67.4%, 
47.6%, and 61.3% of first-born, middle-born, and last-born sons, respectively. Parents as helpers were 
reported by 43.5%, 27.2%, and 29.0% of first-borns, middle-borns, and last-borns, and 63.0%, 45.6% and 
58.1% reported helping a parent. Middle-born sons reported parent interactants significantly less often than 
other sons (likelihood-ratio=5.416, df=1, P=0.020), because first-born sons reported a parent helper 
(likelihood-ratio=3.855, df=1, P=0.050) and a reciprocating parent ((likelihood-ratio=4.227, df=1, P=0.040) 
most often, while middle-born sons reported helping their parents less than other sons (likelihood-
ratio=4.216, df=1, P=0.040). 
As expected, when controlling for birth order, village, religion, and having a living parent among farmers 
in the same generation, younger farmers were more likely to cite parents in their networks than older 
farmers  (age: OR (95% CI)=0.9 (0.8–1.0), P=0.025; Model 1, Table 3).  
Consistent with our expectations, we also found a first-born positive bias in citing parents in networks. 
However, when comparing birth-order categories, middle-born sons were significantly less likely to cite a 




































































no significant difference between first- and last-born sons (OR (95% CI)=0.8 (0.3–2.3), P=0.726; Model 1, 
Table 3). These results suggest that first- and last-born sons are more likely to have parent interactants than 
middle-born sons. 
Parents invest in their children in various ways, providing, for example, education and material wealth. 
When education and land-size transfers were included in the model, evidence for birth-order biases were 
insignificant (OR (95% CI)=0.5 (0.2–1.1), P=0.075 and OR (95% CI)=0.9 (0.3–2.6), P=0.841; Model 2), 
suggesting that daily interactions with parents might not be biased in favour of birth order when other types 
of investment are controlled for. Farmers who completed high school were significantly morel likely to 
report their parents as interactants compared with other farmers, (OR (95% CI)=4.0 (1.5–10.7), P=0.006; 
Model 2). Finally, we found no birth-order biases among sons reporting a parent as a reciprocator (OR 
(95% CI)=0.5 (0.2–1.1), P=0.101 and OR (95% CI)=0.5 (0.2–1.5), P=0.241; Model 3) or among sons 
reporting a parent as a direct supporter (OR (95% CI)=0.5 (0.2–1.1), P=0.095 and OR (95% CI)=0.5 (0.2–
1.4), P=0.172; Model 4). 
1.2 Non-parental kin and non-kin support 
Non-parental interactions comprised an important component of social-support networks in our dataset: 
42.28% of interactants were non-parental kin, including 40.03% among the inheritor group and 45.21% 
among the redistribution group. 
GLMs with Poisson regression revealed a significant difference in the total number of non-parental kin 
interactants cited by inheritor farmers across the three different birth-order categories, controlling for age, 
number of male siblings, land size, village, education, and religion. We observed a decrease in the number 
of non-parental kin cited with successive birth-order categories (Fig. 2). Middle-born and last-born sons 
reported fewer non-parental kin in their networks compared with first-born sons (expB (95% CI)=0.7 (0.6–
1.0), P=0.062, expB (95% CI)=0.5 (0.3–0.8), P=0.003, reciprocally). None of the control variables had a 
significant effect on model fit (Table 4). Those birth-order biases appeared to result from non-direct-
reciprocal interactions. There was not a significant difference in reporting reciprocators among sons of 
different birth-order categories  (reciprocally expB (95% CI)=0.9 (0.6–11.4), P=0.817, (expB (95% CI)=0.7 
(0.4–1.3), P=0.257). Among the control variables, only village had an effect, with respondents from village 





































































Fig.2 Effect of intra-sex birth-order categories on the number of non-parental kin cited in daily support 
networks for the two groups. 
Fig.2a Number of non-parental kin cited presented as marginal means (+SE); n=180, first-born sons (FB) 
n=46; middle-born sons (MB) n=103, last-born sons (LB) n=31. Covariates appearing in the model are 
fixed at the following values: number of male siblings=5.07, land size=0.64 ha, age of respondent=31.48 
years. We controlled for religion, education level, village, and land origin 
Fig.2b Number of non-parental kin cited are presented as marginal means (+SE); n=151, first-born sons 
(FB) n=48; middle-born sons (MB) n=79; last-born sons (LB) n=24. Covariates appearing in the mode are 
fixed at the following values: number of male siblings=4.91, land size=2.38 ha, respondent age =57.75 
years. We controlled for religion, education level, land origin, and village 
 
Results for the redistribution group followed a different pattern, where we found significant differences 
across the three birth-order categories. First- and last-born sons reported fewer non-parental kin in their 
networks compared with middle-born sons (expB (95% CI)=0.6 (0.5–0.9), P=0.010 and expB (95% 
CI)=0.5 (0.3–0.8), P=0.004). Only religion had a significant effect as a control variable, with Christians 
having larger networks than Muslims (expB (95% CI)=1.8 (1.0–3.1), P=0.045). Due to our small sample 
size, pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means were run for middle-born sons compared with 
other birth-order sons for both religions. Similar patterns were noticeable for Christians and Muslims, with 
middle-born sons citing more non-parental kin compared with other sons (Christians: mean difference 
(middle-born vs. other sons)±SE=0.61±0.19, P=0.001; Muslims: mean difference (middle-born vs. other 
sons)±SE=0.35±0.16, P=0.016). Religion did not impact patterns of birth-order biases. Birth-order biases in 
non-parental kin network size were dependent of non-reciprocal interactions as we found no significant 
differences in the number of reciprocators according to birth order (expB (95% CI)=1.0 (0.6–1.6), P=0.924 
and expB (95% CI)=0.9 (0.5–1.8), P=0.814). When controlling for all other variables, village, high-school 
education, land size, and land origin (redistribution vs. inheritance) had a significant effect on the number 




































































P=0.009), as did farmers without a high-school education (expB (95% CI)=0.3 (0.2–0.7), P=0.002). 
Farmers with larger land holdings reported more reciprocators (expB (95% CI)=1.4 (1.0–1.8), P=0.027), 
and, finally, farmers who did not receive land from family reported having more reciprocators (expB (95% 
CI)=2.0 (1.0–4.2), P=0.050). 
Prediction 2: Reciprocity and kin-selection shape farmers’ daily support networks 
The inheritor group cited more kin than non-kin (z=-2.455, P=0.014, Wilcoxon signed-rank test), while the 
redistribution group cited as many kin as non-kin (z=-0.236, P=0.814). A substantial component of kin 
interactions was based on daily direct reciprocity: 49.7% of kin interactions of the inheritor farmers and 
37.4% of kin interactions of the redistribution farmers were direct-reciprocal interactions, which suggests 
the importance of direct payoff even with kin.  
 Respondents reported significantly more close-kin reciprocators than distant-kin reciprocators (N=331, z=-
8.849, P<0.0001, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests), suggesting that reciprocity with close kin might be favoured 
because of the compound profits of direct-reciprocity payoffs and indirect-fitness payoffs from kin 
selection. Both farmer groups reported significantly more reciprocal interactions with close kin than distant 
kin (inheritor farmers: n=180, z=-6.313, P<0.0001; redistribution farmers: n=151, z=-4.857, P<0.0001, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).  
Farmers reported significantly more non-reciprocal interactions with kin than with non-kin (all 
respondents: N=331, z=-5.545, P<0.0001; inheritor group: n=180, z=-4.402, P<0.0001; redistribution 
group: n=151, z=-3.444, P=0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). They also reported significantly more non-
reciprocal interactions with close kin than with distant kin (all respondents: N=331z=-8.296, P<0.0001; 
inheritor group: n=180, z=-5.727, P<0.0001; redistribution group: n=151, z=-6.025, P<0.0001,Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests). This trend held when considering only non-reciprocal helpers: farmers reported 
significantly more non-reciprocal kin helpers than non-reciprocal non-kin helpers (all respondents: N=331, 
z=-2.545, P=0.011) and significantly more close-kin non-reciprocal helpers than distant-kin non-reciprocal 






































































The findings from this natural experiment allow us to identify patterns of intra-household inequalities in 
terms of support networks for two wealth transmission modalities. Where material wealth is inherited, 
support network inequalities follow patterns of material inequalities, like the ones observed by Gibson and 
Gurmu (2011), suggesting that social capital in support networks reinforces material inequalities between 
brothers in the context of limited resources.  When wealth is not inherited and all sons had equal access to 
land, other patterns of support network biases appeared, suggesting that social capital might at least partly 
offset the disadvantage of sons receiving the least cumulative parental investment, which is consistent with 
findings from Salmon (2003), Rhode et al. (2003), Salmon and Daly (1998). Overall, our findings suggest 
that heritable wealth and land transfers, by influencing material and social capital, might have an important 
role in the emergence and persistence of inequality in this agricultural population, similar to findings by 
Smith et al. (2010). Our findings also imply that direct reciprocity appears to explain an important part of 
kin cooperation, providing additional support for a more nuanced explanation of kin cooperation compared 
with sole kin selection, as found in a number of different contexts (Jaeggi and Gurven 2013). Here, 
support-network sizes were consistent with predictions from the literature, particularly Dunbar’s work on 
biological constraints on human social networks, which predicts that “natural” support-network sizes  range 
from 3–5 people (Dunbar & Spoor 1995, Zhou et al. 2005, Hamilton et al. 2007).  
Prediction 1: Birth-order biases in support-network size and composition 
We found strong evidence of kin-selection, coinciding with multigeniture with a first-born son advantage, 
in the inheritor group. First-born farmers were more likely to name parents as daily support partners, 
particularly as reciprocators. Thus, first-borns preferentially received parental investment, but also, by 
reciprocating, reduced their parents’ potential kin-selection costs. However, when controlling for other 
variables, this effect was weaker and, at best, an insignificant tendency. Non-parental kin support size was 
biased toward first-born sons, an effect that was not driven by reciprocity. This pattern reveals that first-
born farmers are advantaged in terms of both material (Gibson and Gurmu 2011) and social capital, which 
decreases their household vulnerability relative to other farmers. We also found that middle-born and last-
born sons diversified their networks by reciprocating with more non-kin compared with first-born sons. 




































































networks, possibly because they diversified their networks to include more non-parental kin (Salmon and 
Daly 1998, Salmon 2003, Rhode et al. 2003). Middle-born farmers reported more non-parental kin in their 
networks than did other farmers, and these interactions were mostly characterized by non-direct reciprocal 
interactions, suggesting other non-exclusive mechanisms than direct reciprocity, such as kin selection, 
delayed reciprocity, or indirect reciprocity. For both groups, last-born sons were among the most 
disadvantaged in terms of their kin-support networks, as they reported fewer kin than other inheritor 
farmers. According to Gibson and Gurmu (2011), “the number of elder brothers reduces a man’s 
agricultural productivity, marriage, and reproductive success, as resources diminish and competition 
increases with each additional sibling.” Thus, a last-born disadvantage in material resources and fitness was 
sufficiently impactful to generate a negative bias in daily kin support and to drive last-borns to diversify 
their network to non-kin through reciprocity. A negative kin bias might be even more dramatic for last-born 
sons who had no land access, possibly forcing them to leave their community for low-skilled jobs in urban 
centres.  
Last-born farmers from the redistribution group were also disadvantaged. Alongside first-born sons, they 
reported less non-parental kin support compared with middle-born sons, but they tended to report more 
diversification via reciprocity with non-kin compared with their brothers. These results suggest a possible 
continuity of first-born son preference during the redistribution period, which might not have been entirely 
offset by the governmental land redistribution. Despite sweeping redistribution policies of the revolution-
era government, evidence suggests that not all intra-household and inter-household resource inequalities 
were dismantled. Our focus group discussions and qualitative-interview informants told us that the socio-
economic statuses of families in past generations were still important for arranging marriages. Brothers 
might not have had to compete for a critical livelihood resource because they all received equal plots from 
the government, but there are other pathways through which sibling competition could arise. On the one 
hand, a first-born son advantage could persist into later years, which could lead to first-born sons being 
more family oriented and less non-kin oriented than other sons. On another hand, last-born sons might 
work harder and take more risks to build non-kin relationships through direct reciprocity, which is 
consistent with farmer comments during focus groups. Last-born sons were said to be “more difficult to 




































































also more risky and adventurous,” compared with their older brothers. Sulloway (1996) claimed that 
parental investment and sibling competition create a niche effect during childhood that influences 
construction of personality and sociability constructs that persist into adulthood. Other studies have 
investigated the influence of family size and composition on personality and social attitudes at young ages 
(Salmon and Daly, 1998, Salmon 2003); some of these studies found that biases persist into adulthood 
when offspring are less dependent on parental investment (Salmon 1998), but others found that parental-
investment biases are less influential (Pollet and Nettle 2009) or absent (Rhode et al. 2003, Pollet and 
Nettle 2007, 2009) in adulthood, possibly because of adjustments in support-network configuration over a 
lifetime. We observed significant biases among adult farmers in our study sample, suggesting the 
importance of material and social resources in shaping support.   
Respondent age tended to affect network size, probably only because parents were more often cited as 
interactants by the younger-generation farmers. Age was not associated with non-parental kin and non-kin 
interactions, even when we evaluated the two generations separately. Within the inheritor group, younger 
farmers were expected to interact more with kin than older farmers, because they had higher reproductive 
value, probably had less agricultural experience, had less labour power within their households because 
their children were still very young, and had younger parents with more ability to help. On the one hand, 
older farmers in the redistribution group could be expected to interact with more people generally, 
including kin, because of their elder status; on the other hand, they could be expected  to interact with fewer 
people, because they have les ability to reciprocate support. Our results suggest that compositional changes 
in agricultural and domestic interactions, rather than network size changes, might occur during farmers’ 
lifetimes; such compositional changes include interactant identities, interaction type, and direction of 
interaction. 
We also found that religion, education, and village had a significant effect on networks, revealing the 
importance of individual and community context. Muslims were a minority in the study villages, so they 
might have had fewer kin in their village and might have had a preference for Muslim interactants; hence, 
Muslim inheritors would have fewer non-parental kin and redistribution farmers would have fewer non-kin 
reciprocators than Christians. High-school education appears to be an attractive characteristic for 




































































farmers from the redistribution group reported more non-parental kin reciprocators. Finally, we observed a 
significant village effect, with farmers from village 1 reporting significantly smaller networks compared to 
farmers in village 2. 
In this population, wealth, as measured by land size, did not seem to influence farmers’ networks, apart 
from the number of non-parental kin reciprocators in the redistribution group, suggesting that origin of land 
access (inheritor vs. redistribution) was more impactful than land size on kin investment in daily support 
networks. Land size among our sample was fairly homogenous and the variance was small; furthermore, 
only landowners were included and they were all from large families with at least three sons. Because of 
unmeasured informal arrangements for land access (Gavian and Ehui 1999), official land size might be an 
underestimated proxy for the actual land size used for production. Therefore, it might be fruitful to explore 
other types of wealth. Cues about the connection between support networks and material resources, 
especially in difficult times, have been identified. For example, Caudell, Rotolo and Grima (2015), showed 
that, among the Sidamo people of southern Ethiopia, charismatic individuals in informal lending networks 
were wealthier than other farmers in terms of cattle herd size. Other work, identified non-linear wealth 
dynamics on the formation of informal insurance networks, with the poorest being excluded from those 
networks (Santos and Barrett 2006). 
However, in our pilot work in the study site, low variation was observed in herd sizes. Farmers used a pair 
of oxen to work their land, and might have two pairs if they have larger land holdings. Thus, more complex 
indexes might be necessary to evaluate wealth. It is also possible that resources might have a smaller 
impact on daily interactions compared with their impact on insurance networks, where resources increase 
resilience in difficult times. 
Prediction 2: Reciprocity and kin-selection shape farmers’ daily support networks 
Our results showed that kin make up an important proportion of support networks, which is consistent with 
kin-selection theory (Hamilton 1964). In small-scale societies, close kin are overrepresented compared with 
distant kin and non-kin (Gurven et al. 2000, Patton 2005). Kin over-representation is also visible in 
Western societies (Dunbar and Spoors 1995). However, reciprocity (including reciprocal altruism as per, 
Trivers 1971) plays an important role in shaping support ties among kin (Patton 2005, Gurven et al. 2000). 




































































exchange is a form of reciprocity biased by kinship.” Additionally, food transfers on an Ache reservation in 
northeastern Paraguay “accords better with reciprocal altruism theory than with kin selection theory” 
(Allen-Arrave, Gurven and Hill 2008). Finally a meta-analysis of 23 studies from 32 populations of humans 
and primates highlighted the importance of reciprocity on shaping cooperation, and demonstrated that the 
relative effect of reciprocity for sharing was similar to those of kinship and tolerated scrounging (Jaeggi 
and Gurven 2013). 
Non-reciprocal interactions should be more common among kin than non-kin, and among close kin than 
distant kin, because of indirect fitness payoffs. Reciprocity theory (Trivers 1971) potentially explains most 
interactions with non-kin, as well as many kin interactions, especially distant kin with whom indirect-
fitness profits from helping behaviour are relatively lower (Hames 1987, Gurven et al. 2000, Allen-Arrave, 
Gurven and Hill 2008). We expected most non-kin interactions to be reciprocal, but expected more 
variation in reciprocity among kin interactions. In fact, support networks constituted multi-directional 
interactions: respondents stimulated and modulated their support by lowering the giver’s costs through 
some amount of daily direct and indirect reciprocity. Interestingly, kin were frequently included in 
reciprocal relationships, even though the frequency of non-reciprocal interactions among kin increased with 
genetic relatedness. Delayed (contingent) reciprocity, which is difficult to evaluate and identify, might have 
been mistaken in our dataset for non-reciprocal interactions, and so there may be even more variations and 
higher quantities of reciprocal relationships among these farmer communities. According to these results, 
even when considering classification of direct reciprocity/non-direct reciprocity and even when the last 
category includes contingent (delayed) and indirect reciprocity (through another person), patterns for non-
reciprocal interactions followed predictions of kin selection while reciprocity, alongside kin selection, 
appeared to be an important driver of daily reciprocal kin interactions. In other words, kin selection does 
not appear to be the sole explanation for support received from kin.  
Conclusion 
Two major implications can be drawn from our findings in this natural-experiment context. First, we were 
able to understand how heritable wealth shapes daily support networks in a contemporary agricultural 




































































al (2010) and Boone (1992) who concluded that the control and transmission of scarce inelastic wealth, 
such as farmland, was an important factor in the emergence of inequality. 
Second, in this small-scale land-based community, both kin selection and reciprocity shaped adult farmers’ 
daily support networks, suggesting that reciprocity is important for cooperation among kin, as also shown 
by Jaeggi and Gurven (2013) in a number of contexts. 
Our findings shed light on the behaviour and evolution of human social interactions by showing that people 
and their kin adjust their daily support behaviour in a complex manner that is consistent with fitness 
predictions. Increased socio-demographic and economic changes are expected in Ethiopia. Contraception 
has recently become more widespread (Alvergne et al. 2012), leading to a smaller average family size, 
which might change future intra-household resource distribution by reducing resource dilution. However, 
because of on-going population growth, land erosion, and limited arable land (Tefera et al. 2002)—all of 
which will only grow more serious with climate change and geo-political instability—resource scarcity and 
livelihood insecurity are likely to increase and further aggravate competition and inequalities, within and 
between households. Some individuals will likely have greater resilience in times of shock because they 
can rely on their networks (Caudell, Rotolo and Grima 2015), while the poorest and most vulnerable might 






































































Aldrich, D. (2012). Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post Disaster Recovery. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Aldrich, D., & Meyer, M. (2014). Social Capital and Community Resilience. American Behavioral 
Scientist, doi: 10.1177/0002764214550299.  
Allen-Arave, W., Gurven, M., Hill, K. (2008). Reciprocal altruism, rather than kin selecton, maintains 
nepotistic food transfers on an Ache reservation. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 305-318. 
Alvergne, A., Lawson, D., Clarke, P., Gurmu, E., Mace, R. (2012). Fertility, parental investment, and the 
early adoption of modern contraception in rural Ethiopia. American Journal of Human Biology. 
25(1), 107-115. 
Bernard, H. (2002). Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 5th 
Edition.  
Boone, J. (1992). Competition, conflict, and the development of social hierarchies. In Evolutionary ecology 
and human behavior. E. Smith and B. Winterhalder, eds. Pp. 301–337. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de 
Gruyter.  
Boone, J. (1986). Parental Investment and Elite Family Structure in Preindustrial States: A Case Study of 
Late Medieval-Early Modern Portuguese Genealogies. American Anthropologist, New Series, 88 
(4), 859-878. 
Carter, G., Wilkinson, G. (2013). Food sharing in vampire bats, reciprocal help predicts donations more 
than relatedness or harassment. Proceedings of The Royal Society, 280, 20122573. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2573 
Caudell, M., Rotolo, T., Grima (2015). Informal lending networks in rural Ethiopia. Social Networks, 40, 
34-42. 
Clarke, A., Low, B. (1992). Ecological correlates of human dispersal in 19th century Sweden. Animal 
Behaviour, 44, 677-693. 




































































Clutton-Brock, T. (1984). Reproductive effort and terminal investment in iteroparous animals. The 
American Naturalist, 123(2), 212-229. 
Congdon Fors, H., Houngbedji, K., Lindskog, L. (2017). Land certification and schooling in rural Ethiopia. 
PSE Working Papers n° 2015-30. 
Draper, P., Hames, R. (2000). Birth order, sibling investment, and fertility among Ju/'hoansi (!Kung). 
Human Nature, 11(2), 117-156. 
Dunbar, R. (2008). Cognitive Constraints on the Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks. Group 
Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 12(1), 7–16.  
Dunbar, R., Spoors, M. (1995). Social networks, support cliques, and kinship. Human Nature, 6(3), 273-90. 
Fafchamps, M., Lund, S. (2003). Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines. Journal of Development 
Economics, 71(2), 261-287. 
Faurie, C., Russell, A., & Lummaa, V. (2009). Middleborns Disadvantaged? Testing Birth-Order Effects on 
Fitness in Pre-Industrial Finns. Plos One, 4(5), 56-80. 
Fowler, F. (1995). Improving survey questions: design and evaluation. Applied Social Research Series 38.  
Gavian S., Ehui S. (1999). Measuring the production efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts in a 
mixed crop-livestock system in Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 20, 37-49. 
Gibson, M. (2002). Development and demographic change: the reproductive ecology of a rural Ethiopian 
Oromo population. PhD thesis. London: University College London.  
Gibson, M., Gurmu, E. (2012). Rural to urban migration is an unforeseen impact of development 
intervention in Ethiopia. Plos One, 7(11), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048708. 
Gibson, M., Lawson, D. (2011). Modernization increases parental investment and sibling resource 
competition: evidence from a rural development initiative in Ethiopia, Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 32, 97 – 105. 
Gibson, M., Gurmu, E. (2011). Land inheritance establishes sibling competition for marriage and 
reproduction in rural Ethiopia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 




































































Gibson, M., Sear, R., (2010) Does wealth increase parental investment biases in child education? Evidence 
from two African populations on the cusp of the fertility transition. Current Anthropology, 51, 693 
– 701. 
 Gurven, M., Hill, K., Kaplan, H., Hurtado, A., Lyles, R. (2000). Food transfers among Hiwi foragers of 
Venezuela: tests of reciprocity. Human Ecology, 28(2), 171-218. 
Hames, R. (1987). Garden labor exchange among the Ye’kwana. Ethology and Sociobiology, 8(4), 259-284 
Hamilton, W. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1-
16. 
Hamilton, M., Milne, B., Walker, R., Burger, O., Brown, J. (2007). The complex structure of hunter-
gatherer social networks. Proceedings of the Royal Society, doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.0564. 
Hertwig, R., Davis, J., Sulloway, F. (2002). Parental investment: how an equity motive can produce 
inequality. Psychological Bulletin, 128(5), 728–745. 
Hill, R., & Dunbar, R. (2003). Social network size in humans. Human nature. 14(1), 53-72. 
Hrdy, S., & Judge, D. (1993). Darwin and the puzzle of primogeniture. Human nature. 4(1), 1-45. 
Jaeggi, A., Gurven, M. (2013). Reciprocity explains food sharing in humans and other primates 
independent of kin selection and tolerated scrounging: a phylogenetic meta-analysis. Proceedings 
of The Royal Society B, 280: 20131615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.1615  
Judge, D., Hrdy, S. (  1992). Allocation of accumulated resources among close kin: inheritance in 
Sacramento, California, 1890-1984. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13, 495--522. 
Kidwell, J. (1982). The Neglected Birth Order: Middleborns. Journal of Marriage and Family, 44(1), 225-
235. 
Krosnick, J., & Fabrigar, L. (2012). Survey Measurement and Process Quality. Wiley Series in Probability 
and Statistics.  
Lewis, J. (2010). Connecting and Cooperating: Social Capital and Public Policy. Sydney, N.S.W. : UNSW 
Press. 
Narayan, D., & Pritchett, L. 1999. Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social Capital in Rural 
Tanzania, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47(4), 871-897. 




































































Pollet, T., Nettle, D. (2007). Birth order and face-to-face contact with a sibling: Firstborns have more 
contact than laterborns. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1796–1806.  
Pollet, T., Nettle, D. (2009). Birth order and adult family relationships: Firstborns have better sibling 
relationships than laterborns. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships. 26(8), 1029-1046. 
Pretty, J. (2003). Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources. Science 302, 1912-1914. 
Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. In: Crothers L., Lockhart C. (eds) 
Culture and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Rohde, P., Atzwanger, K., Butovskaya, M., Lampert, A., Mysterud, I., Sanchez-Andres, A., Sulloway, F. 
(2003). Perceived parental favoritism, closeness to kin, and the rebel of the family  : The effects 
of birth order and sex. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 261–276. 
Salmon, C., (2003). Birth order and relationships. Human Nature, 14(1), 73-88. 
Salmon, C., Daly, M. (1998). Birth Order and Familial Sentiment : Middleborns are Different. Evolution 
and Human Behavior, 19, 299-312. 
Santos, P., Barrett, C., 2006. Informal insurance in the presence of poverty traps: evidence from Southern 
Ethiopia. Cornell University Working Paper.  
Smith, E., Borgerhoff Mulder, M., Bowles, S., Gurven, M., Hertz,T., Shenk, M. (2010). Production 
Systems, Inheritance, and Inequality in Premodern Societies: Conclusions. Current Anthropology, 
51(1), 85-94. 
Sulloway, F. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York, NY, US: 
Pantheon Books. 
 Stanton, M. A., Lonsdorf, E. V., Pusey, A. E., Goodall, J., & Murray, C. M. (2014). Maternal behavior by 
birth order in wild chimpanzees Pan troglodytes increased investment by first-time mothers. 
Current Anthropology, 55(4), 483-489, doi:10.1086/677053. 
Strassman, B., Clarke, A.(1998). Ecological constraints on marriage in rural Ireland. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 19, 33-55. 
Taborsky M. 2013 Social evolution: reciprocity there is. Current Biology. 23, R486 – R488, 
doi:10.1016/j.cub. 2013.04.041. 




































































Oromiya Region: A review. Socio-economics and Policy Research Working Paper 36. 
International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya. 82 pp.  
Towner, M. (2001). Linking dispersal and resources in humans. Life history from Oakham, Massachussets 
(1750-1850). Human Nature, 12(4): 321-349. 
Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57. 
Trivers, R. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell (Ed.), Sexual selection and the 
descent of man, 1871-1971 (pp. 136–179). Chicago, IL: Aldine. 
Trivers, R. (1974). Parent-Offspring Conflict. American Zoologist, 14(1), 249-264. 
Trivers, R., Willard, D. (1973). Natural Selection of Parental Ability to Vary the Sex Ratio of Offspring. 
Science, 179(4068), 90-92. 
Voland E.,  Dunbar, R. (1995). Resource competition and reproduction, the relationship between economic 
and parental strategies in the Krumhorn population (1720-1874). Human Nature, 6 (1): 33-49. 
Zhou, W., Sornette, D., Hill, R., Dunbar, R. (2005). Discrete hierarchical organization of social group sizes. 







































































Does kin-selection theory help to explain support networks among farmers in South-Central 
Ethiopia? 
Lucie Clech1, 2*, Ashley Hazel3, Mhairi A Gibson1  
1 Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of Bristol, 43 Woodland Rd, Bristol BS81TH, 
UK 
2 Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, 50, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 USA 
3 Department of Earth System Science, Stanford University, 473 Via Ortega, Stanford, CA 94305 USA 






Biosketch Click here to access/download;Manuscript;Biosketch.docx


































































Lucie Clech obtained a PhD in Evolutionary Anthropology from the University of Bristol, focusing on 
human behavioural ecology of migration in Ethiopia, before undertaking postdoctoral research at Stanford 
University. Her research covers topics about poverty and family dynamics and includes migration, social 
interactions, education and health in resource-limited communities. Her interdisciplinary background in 
ecology and social sciences led her to focus especially on dynamics of livelihood strategies in response to 
modifications in their socio-economic and demographic environment. 
Ashley Hazel holds a PhD in Natural Resource Ecology from the University of Michigan, and she is 
currently a Research Scientist at Stanford University in the Department of Earth System Science. Her 
research interests include human disease ecology, social network theory, and subsistence migration. 
 
Mhairi Gibson is an Associate Professor in Anthropology at the University of Bristol. As an applied 
evolutionary anthropologist her work applies ideas from human behavioural ecology to emerging 
population health issues in low-income settings. Her fieldwork-based research has explored the causes and 
consequences of human population and health change in rural Ethiopia, and the social dynamics of 
normative practices which are harmful to women. Mhairi Gibson was lead editor (with David Lawson) of 
‘Applied evolutionary anthropology: Darwinian approaches to contemporary world issues’, published by 







































































Does kin-selection theory help to explain support networks among farmers in South-Central 
Ethiopia? 
Lucie Clech1, 2*, Ashley Hazel3, Mhairi A Gibson1  
1 Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of Bristol, 43 Woodland Rd, Bristol BS81TH, 
UK 
2 Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, 50, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 USA 
3 Department of Earth System Science, Stanford University, 473 Via Ortega, Stanford, CA 94305 USA 
*Corresponding author: Lucie Clech (lucieclech@gmail.com, 0033661598288) 
  
Table Click here to access/download;Table;Tables final.docx
 
 
Table 1. GLMs with Poisson regression for network size (model 1) and kin network size (model 2,3,4). 
N=331.  
Models: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 ExpB(95%CI) P ExpB(95%CI) P ExpB(95%CI) P ExpB(95%CI) P 
Intercept 4.4(3.4-5.7) 0.000** 1.8(1.2-2.6) 0.004** 1.7(1.2-2.5) 0.003** 2.2(1.5-3.4) 0.000** 
Age of respondent 
(years) 
1.0(1.0-1.0) 0.067 1.0(1.0-1.0) 0.282   1.0(1.0-1.0) 0.365 
BO: First-born 
children(/last) 
      1.2(0.8-1.6) 0.361 
BO: Middle-born 
children(/last) 
      1.2(0.9-1.6) 0.225 
Sibling size (males 
and females) 
      1.0(1.0-1.0) 0.273 
BO: First-born 
sons (/last) 
1.0(0.8-1.2) 0.715 1.5(1.1-2.0) 0.005** 1.5(1.1-2.1) 0.015*   
BO: Middle-born 
sons (/last) 
1.08(0.9-1.3) 0.362 1.5(1.2-2.0) 0.002** 1.2(0.8-1.6) 0.344   
Number of male 
siblings 
1.0(1.0-1.0) 0.708 1.0(0.9-1.0) 0.943 1.0(1.0-1.0) 0.961   
Village 1 (/2) 0.8(0.7-1.0) 0.010** 0.9(0.8-1.1) 0.200 0.9(0.8-1.1) 0.348 0.9(0.7-1.0) 0.160 
Land size (ha) 1.0(0.9-1.1) 0.532 0.9(0.8-1.1) 0.475 1.0(0.8-1.1) 0.532 0.9(0.8-1.1) 0.394 
Generations 
(redist/inheritor) 








    2.0(1.1-3.5) 0.014   
         
Notes: There was no interaction effect between land size x village, so they were not included in the models. Model 1=number of interactants cited in networks, model 
2, 3, and 4=number of kin interactants cited in networks. Model 3 is a variation of model 2 and includes generational group and an interaction effect BO*generational 
group. Model 4 includes birth-order categories instead of intra-sex birth-order categories. * p=0.05 **p=0.01 
 
Table 2: Distribution by interactant relatedness 
  
















































































All 1107 45.44 54.56 12.28 
 
42.28 43.45 20.41 3.52 7.23 11.11 
Inheritor group 627 42.90 57.10 17.06 
 
40.03 44.66 22.49 4.46 0.64 12.44 
Redistribution 
group 480 48.75 51.25 6.04 
 
 
45.21 41.87 17.71 2.29 15.83 9.37 
           





Table 3: Logistic regressions for reporting at least one parent in their network. 
 
Notes: Logistic regressions for models 1and 2: citing at least one parent in their network, model 3: reciprocating with at least one parent and model 4: reporting 
support from at least one parent. Model 2 is a variation of model 1 and includes different types of parental investment (land size, land transferred and education). 
Controlling for having at least one alive parent. * p=0.05 **p=0.01 
 
Table 4: GLMs with Poisson regression for the number of non-parental kin cited, non-parental kin and non-
kin reciprocators for the two generational groups. 
 
Number of non-parental kin cited in support network 
 



























   
Bo: last-born(/first-born sons) 
31/46 
0.5(0.3-0.8) 0.003 ** 
 
   





0.6(0.5-0.9) 0.010 ** 
Bo: last-born (/middle-born sons) 
 
   
24/79 
0.5(0.3-0.8) 0.004 ** 

































1.8(1.0-3.1) 0.045 * 
Land origin (not from family/from family) 
19/161 
0.7(0.4-1.1) 0.169  
128/23 
1.3(0.8-2.0) 0.238  
 
 
   
 
   
 
Models:  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  OR(95%CI) P  OR(95%CI) P  OR(95%CI) P  OR(95%CI
) 
P  
Age of respondent 180 0.9(0.8-1.0) 0.025 * 0.9(0.8-1.0) 0.011 * 0.9(0.8-1.0) 0.010 ** 0.9(0.8-0.9) 0.002 ** 
Intrasex birth-order 
categories 
  0.095   0.141   0.233   0.200  
Middle-born(/first) 103/46 0.4(0.2-1.0) 0.045 * 0.5(0.2-1.1) 0.075  0.5(0.2-1.1) 0.101  0.5(0.2-1.1) 0.095  
Last-born(/first) 31/46 0.8(0.3-2.3) 0.726  0.9(0.3-2.6) 0.841  0.5(0.2-1.5) 0.241  0.5(0.2-1.4) 0.172  
Number of male 
siblings  
180 1.0(0.8-1.2) 0.847  1.0(0.8-1.2) 0.940  0.9(0.8-1.2) 0.638  0.9(0.8-1.1) 0.522  
High school educated 
(/not educated) 
    4.0(1.5-10.7) 0.006 **       
Land size (ha) 180    1.0(0.5-12.0) 0.905        
Village 1(/2) 105/75 0.4(0.2-0.9) 0.030 * 0.4(0.2-0.8) 0.014 * 0.4(0.2-0.9) 0.026 * 0.6(0.3-1.2) 0.129  
Christians (/Muslims) 143/37 0.5(0.2-1.2) 0.119  0.4(0.2-1.1) 0.092  0.8(0.3-2.5) 0.846  0.6(0.2-1.4) 0.242  
Land provided by the 
family (/not) 
    1.3(0.4-4.1) 0.635        
Constant  16.904 0.072  25.0 0.089  14.058 0.128  32.7 0.039 * 




Number of non-parental kin reciprocators in support network 
 



























   





   







Bo: last-born (/middle-born sons) 
 
















1.4(1.0-1.8) 0.027 * 
Village 1(/2) 
105/75 
0.6(0.4-0.9) 0.018 * 
88/63 
0.5(0.3-0.8) 0.009 ** 













Land origin (not from family/from family) 
19/161 
0.6(0.3-1.3) 0.229  
128/23 
2.0(1.0-4.2) 0.050 * 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
Number of non-kin reciprocators in support network 
 













4.2(1.3-113.8) 0.017 * 







Bo: middle-born(/first-born sons) 
103/46 
1.5(1.0-2.2) 0.037 * 
 
   
Bo: last-born(/first-born sons) 
31/46 
1.6(1.0-2.6) 0.045 * 
 
   







Bo: last-born (/middle-born sons) 
 
   
24/79 
1.5(1.0-2.4) 0.055 . 















0.6(0.4-0.9) 0.004 ** 
88/63 
0.4(0.3-0.6) 0.000 ** 













Land origin (not from family/from family) 
19/161 
1.0(0.6-1.6) 0.890  
128/23 
0.8(0.5-1.3) 0.444  
 
 
   
 
   
Notes: * p=0.05 **p=0.01 
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Sample Variables Mean SD Median 
Min-
max N Frequencies 
Full sample Full network size 3.34 1.38 3.00 0-7 331   
  Kin network size 1.82 1.51 2.00 0-7 331   
  Non-kin network size 1.52 1.46 1.00 0-6 331   
  Number of kin reciprocators 0.82 1.11 0.00 0-5 331   
  Number of non-kin reciprocators 1.02 1.35 0.00 0-5 331   
  Number of close-kin reciprocators 0.65 0.92 0.00 0-4 331   
  Number of distant-kin reciprocators 0.17 0.56 0.00 0-4 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal kin 1.01 1.41 0.00 0-6 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal non-kin 0.50 0.98 0.00 0-5 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal close-kin 0.81 1.22 0.00 0-6 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal distant-kin 0.20 0.51 0.00 0-4 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal kin helpers 0.41 0.75 0.00 0-3 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal non-kin helpers 0.27 0.63 0.00 0-3 331   
  Number of non-reciprocal close-kin helpers 0.30 0.63 0.00 0-3 331   
  
Number of non-reciprocal distant-kin 
helpers 0.11 0.36 0.00 0-2 331   
  Age (years) 43.46 15.71 38.00 21-90 331   
  Land size (ha) 1.43 1.14 1.00 0.25-5 331   
  Sibling size 8.33 3.26 8.00 3-22 331   
  Male sibling size 5.00 1.97 4.00 3-15 331   
  BO categories         331 firstborns=65 
            331 middleborns=233 
            331 lastborns=33 
  Male BO categories         331 first-born sons=94 
            331 middle-born sons=182 
            331 last-born sons=55 
  Village         331 village 1=193 
            331 village 2=138 
  Generations         331 inheritors=151 
            331 redistribution recipients=180 
  Land origin         331 
have received land from 
family=184 
            331 
have not received land from 
family=147 
Inheritor group 
Number of kin cited 1.99 1.53 2.00 0-6 180   
Number of non-kin cited 1.94 1.39 1.00 0-6 180   
  Number of kin reciprocators 0.99 1.17 1.00 0-5 180   
  Number of non-kin reciprocators 1.02 1.32 0.00 0-5 180   
  Number of close-kin reciprocators 0.78 0.96 1.00 0-4 180   
  Number of distant-kin reciprocators 0.21 0.61 0.00 0-4 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal kin 1.00 1.40 0.00 0-6 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal non-kin 0.47 0.89 0.00 0-4 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal close-kin 0.77 1.15 0.00 0-5 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal distant-kin 0.23 0.58 0.00 0-4 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal kin helpers 0.40 0.74 0.00 0-3 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal non-kin helpers 0.26 0.60 0.00 0-3 180   
  Number of non-reciprocal close-kin helpers 0.28 0.58 0.00 0-3 180   
  
Number of non-reciprocal distant-kin 
helpers 0.13 0.39 0.00 0-2 180   
  Number of non-parental kin network size 1.39 1.33 1.00 0-5 180   
  Number of non-parental kin reciprocators 0.71 1.04 0.00 0-5 180   
  Age (years) 31.48 4.42 32.00 21-40 180   
  Male sibling size 5.07 2.00 5.00 3-13 180   
  Land size (ha) 0.64 0.60 0.5 
0.25-
3.25 180   
  Cited a parent         180 yes=99 
            180 no=81 
  Reported a parent helper         180 yes=57 
            180 no=123 
  Reported helping a parent         180 yes=94 
            180 no=86 
  Reported a reciprocating parent         180 yes=49 
            180 no=131 
  Have at least one alive parent         180 yes=157 
            180 no=23 
  Male Bo categories         180 first-born sons=46 
            180 middle-born sons=103 
            180 last-born sons=31 
  High school education         180 high-school educated=35 
            180 did not complete high-school=145 
  Village         180 village 1=105 
            180 village 2=75 
  Religion         180 Christians=143 
            180 Muslims=37 
  Land origin         180 
have received land from 
family=161 
            180 




Number of kin cited 1.63 1.48 1.00 0-7 151   
Number of non-kin cited 1.55 1.54 1.00 0-6 151   
  Number of kin reciprocators 0.61 1.00 0.00 0-4 151   
  Number of non-kin reciprocators 1.03 1.39 0.00 0-4 151   
  Number of close kin reciprocators 0.48 0.85 0.00 0-4 151   
  Number of distant kin reciprocators 0.13 0.48 0.00 0-3 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal kin 1.02 1.43 0.00 0-6 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal non-kin 0.53 1.08 0.00 0-5 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal close-kin 0.85 1.29 0.00 0-6 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal distant kin 0.17 0.41 0.00 0-2 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal kin helpers 0.42 0.75 0.00 0-3 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal non kin helpers 0.28 0.68 0.00 0-3 151   
  Number of non-reciprocal close kin helpers 0.34 0.68 0.00 0-3 151   
  
Number of non-reciprocal distant kin 
helpers 0.9 0.32 0.00 0-2 151   
  Number of non-parental kin network size 1.44 1.33 1.00 0-6 151   
  Number of non-parental kin reciprocators 0.60 1.00 0.00 0-4 151   
  Age (years) 57.75 11.90 55.00 41-90 151   
  Male sibling size 4.91 1.97 4.00 3-15 151   
  Land size (ha) 2.38 0.88 2.5 
0.25-
5.00 151   
  Male Bo categories         151 first-born sons=48 
              middle-born sons=79 
              last-born sons=24 
  High-school education         151 high-school educated=18 
              did not complete high school=133 
  Village         151 village 1=88 
              village 2=63 
  Religion         151 Christians=134 
              Muslims=17 
  Land origin         151 have received land from family=23 
              
have not received land from 
family=128 
  Have at least one alive parent         151 yes=54 
            151 no=97 
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